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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE F. HAYS, Guardian ad litem 
for KA THY SHAWN HAYS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RAYMOND DONALD ROBERTSON 
Defendant and Appellant, ' 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, Case 
Garnishee and Appellant. No. 
MRS. MEL VIN SANDERS, Guardian 10866 
act litem for PAULETTE F. SANDERS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RA Y:\lOND DONALD ROBERTSON, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE C01\1PANY, 
Garn;shef' and Appellant 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs both minor children were injured as 
a result of a collision between an automobile driven 
by Raymond Donald Robertson and an automobile 
driven by one of plaintiffs, Kathy Shawn Hays. Judg-
ment was entered in favor of both the plaintiffs 
against Robertson, demand was made upon State 
1 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for 
payment of the judgment. Said demand was refused, 
garnishment issued. Issue was joined on the traverse 
to garnishment answers. The Trial Court entered 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. It determined 
that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany was the liability insurer of Raymond Donald 
Robertson on the date of collision. Plaintiffs were 
awarded judgment in the amount obtained against 
Robertson. The Garnishee-Appellant prosecutes this 
appeal. 
Basic question is the meaning of the insurance 
policy issued by Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against the 
appellant for the amount of the judgment obtained 
against its insured, together with interest and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The insurance carrier, garnishee appellant, 
seeks a reversal of the judgment of the lower court 
and entry of judgment that no coverage was provided 
for defendant Raymond Donald Robertson. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no basic disagreement between the 
parties as to the happening of the accident and the 
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mJuries sustained by the plaintiffs. The only dis-
agreement relates to the meaning of the State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Policy No. 4068 290-
E22-44. 
For five or six years before the accident, Loyd 
J. Robertson had purchased public liability insurance 
from R. W. Steeneck, an agent of State Farm, for 
himself and family ( R 129) . Steeneck was well 
acquainted with the Robertsons, knew the kind of 
protection they wanted and the persons to be pro-
tected CR 130). The family consisted of Loyd, June 
( wife J, and two minor sons, Raymond and Robert 
(Exhibit D-5, R 130). 
Several cars were used by the family over the 
years and insurance ordered by phone by Robertson 
from Steeneck. Raymond was born November 21, 
1943 and on April 6, 1965 would be 21 years old but 
still a member of Loyd's household (Exhibit D-5) . 
Steeneck, on the application, classified the risk 
as Class 9, which is a youthful male driver CR 133, 
Exhibit D-5). The exhibit also shows Raymond as 
the principal driver. 
When the insurance was transferred from the 
1955 Ford to the 1962 Chevrolet, the car title was not 
shown to be in Raymond's name, though it is con-
ceded that such was always the fact CR 100). 
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The Chevrolet was surrendered to the bank 
when Raymond could not pay the purchase price. On 
April 5th Raymond purchased the 1958 Chevrolet to 
replace the 1962 Chevrolet, and the next day the 
accident occurred. Raymond shows his address as at 
his father's home on the application for title to the 
1958 Chevrolet (Exhibit D-6). His father testified he 
had all his clothing at home, although he had rented 
a room to sleep in after he lost his. car so that he could 
catch a ride to work ( R 98). 
The ambiguity was created m the issuance of 
the insurance policy. The policy shows on its face 
that the named insureds are Loyd J. Robertson and 
June Robertson, that persons insured are Loyd J. 
Robertson, R. Robertson and R. D. Robertson. Con-
tinental Bank of Midvale is shown as lienholder. The 
vehicle described was a 1962 Chevrolet pickup at all 
times the property of Raymond. 
The policy language assumes that the named 
insured is the titleholder of the car insured, which 
was not the fact. 
The public liability policy under Definitions 
states: 
"Insured - under coverages A, B, C and M 
the unqualified word 'insured' includes 
( 1 ) the named insured, and 
( 2) if the named insured is a person or 
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persons, also includes his or their 
spouse Cs), if a resident of the same 
household, and 
C 3) if residents of the same household the 
relatives of the first person nam~d in 
the declarations, or of his spouse, and 
( 4) any other person while using the 
owned automobile, provided the opera-
tion and the actual use of such auto-
mobile are with the permission of the 
named insured or such spouse and are 
within the scope of such permission, 
and***." 
The policy defines "owned automobile" m the 
following language: 
"Owned Automobile-means the motor vehicle 
or trailer described in the declarations, and 
includes a temporary substitute automobile, a 
newly acquired automobile,***." 
The "owned automobile" described in the policy 
had been surrendered to the Continental Bank of 
Midvale and Raymond Donald Robertson had pur-
chased the automobile involved in the collision to 
replace it. 
The language of the policy defines "temporary 
substitute automobile" and "newly acquired auto-
mobile" in the following language: 
"Temporary Substitute Automobile-means an 
automobile not owned by the named insured 
or his spouse while temporarily used as a sub-
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stitute for the described automobile when 
withdrawn from normal use because of its 
breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruc-
tion." 
"Newly Acquired Automobile - means an 
automobile, ownership of which is acquired 
by the named insured or his spouse, if a resi-
dent of the same household, if ( 1) it replaces 
an automobile owned by either and covered 
by this policy, or the company insures all 
automobiles owned by the named insured and 
such spouse on the date of its delivery, and 
( 2) the named insured within 30 days follow-
ing such delivery date applies to the company 
for insurance on such newly acquired auto-
mobile. If more than one policy issued by the 
company could be applied to such automobile 
the named insured shall elect which policy 
shall apply. The named insured shall pay 
any additional premium required because of 
the application of the insurance to such newly 
acquired automobile." 
In addition to providing the coverage on the per-
sons in the same household and the persons using the 
owned automobile, the policy provided coverage for 
a non-owned automobile and defines a non-owned 
automobile as: 
"Non-Owned Automobile - means an auto-
mobile or trailer not*** 
( i) (ii) 
(iii) furnished or available for the frequent 
or regular use of the named insured, his 
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spouse, or any relative of either residing in 
the same household, other than a temporary 
substitute automobile." 
The Trial Court found that a fair interpretation 
of the policy provided coverage for Raymond Donald 
Robertson on the 6th of April, 1965 at the time of the 
collision between his automobile and the automobile 
being driven by Kathy Shawn Hays in which Paulette 
F. Sanders was a passenger. 
A reading of the policy and all of its many defi-
nitions and terms indicates that it was ini:ended to 
provide public liability insurance for Raymond 
Robertson under all of the circumstances which arose, 
whether he was driving someone else's car, the Chev-
rolet pickup, a newly acquired car, a substitute auto-
mobile, or a non-owned automobile. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FACT THAT TITLE TO THE 1962 AND 
1958 AUTOMOBILE WAS IN RAYMOND'S 
NAME IS IMMATERIAL. 
The policy of insurance which is Exhibit P-1 is 
a State Farm Mutual Automobile policy and a form 
policy designed to be used in the normal situation 
where the person described as the named insured is 
the owner of the vehicle described on the policy. In 
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the present case, one of the persons to be covered by 
public liability insurance, namely Raymond Robert-
son, was the owner of the vehicle but was not the 
named insured and, as a consequence, there is an 
ambiguity created which must be resolved by inter-
preting the policy to arrive at the intentions of the 
parties. 
The evidence is clear that Loyd J. Robertson 
intended to purchase public liability insurance for 
himself, his wife, and two boys. It also is clear that 
the insurance agent, Steeneck, understood the kind 
of insurance that Robertson wanted and intended to 
give the Robertson family the coverage that Loyd 
Robertson desired. 
It is plaintiff's position that their interpreta-
tion placed on the policy is one which will accomplish 
the purpose that the parties intended to accomplish. 
The risk which Robertsons paid the insurance 
company to insure is described in the insuring agree-
ment as, "To pay on behalf of the insured all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of (A) bodily injury 
sustained by other persons, and ( B) property damage 
caused by accident arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use, including loading or unloading 
of the owned automobile.***" 
(Exhibit P-1, Coverages A and B, Paragraph 1) 
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The unqualified word "insured" in the policy 
is defined as the named insured and his spouse, and 
if resident of the same household, relatives of the 
named insured or his spouse. See Definitions-Insur-
ing Agreement I and II. 
The ownership of the automobile did not in any 
way affect the risk, neither increasing or diminishing 
it. The risk always remained the same to protect, i.e. 
the Loyd J. Robertson family against public liability 
loss. 
A case exactly in point on this matter is General 
Insurance Company vs. Western Fire & Caszmlty Com-
pany, 241 F 2d 289, 5 CCA, (Brown Judge) Cert. 
denied, 77 S. Ct. 1294, 354 US 909, No. 941, June 10, 
195 7. The facts are exactly those in the present case. 
A son 20 years old, living with his mother, insurance 
applied for and taken in the mother's name on a car 
partly owned by the son. This car was traded in for 
a car titled to the son and it then became involved in 
an accident within the 30 day period after the new 
car was acquired. The court there discussed the ques-
tion of the son being the owner of the new car and 
the mother having no interest in it. It placed con-
siderable emphasis on the fact that this was the family 
liability type of policy. It held ownership of the 
vehicle was immaterial. 
People who are not sophisticated in the insurance 
policy language, who have no intention to deceive, 
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and do their best to keep the insurance company 
agent advised, may rely on the company issuing a 
policy which will give to them the protection that 
they need for their own benefit and protect the public 
who might be injured in the use of the vehicles 
involved. 
Judge Brown pointed out that the ownership of 
the vehicle in no way affected the risk which the 
insurance company underwrote nor contributed in 
any way to the happening of the accident and that 
if it were necessary, he would order that the owner-
ship of the vehicle involved and described in the 
policy be correctly described and an amendment to 
the policy ordered. 
The question which seems to be dominant in 
the minds of the courts considering the problem 
before this court is whether or not the risk which is 
insured against is increased by the misstatement as 
to ownership of the vehicle. 
An examination of the language of the insurance 
policy and the various definitions would indicate 
that the company intended to insure the Loyd J. 
Robertson family against public liability from the use 
of motor vehicles. The definitions describe every con-
ceivable contingency that might involve one of the 
persons to be protected. It specifically protected them 
when driving a non-owned automobile, an owned 
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automobile, including an automobile newly acquired 
if it replaces an automobile covered by the policy 
and if, within 30 days, notice of the change of auto-
mobile is given. This collision occurred on the day 
after the newly acquired automobile had been pur-
chased. 
It is respectfully submitted that the circum-
stances are exactly the same and that the General 
Insurance Company vs. Western Fire & Casualty 
Company case is identical on its facts to the case at 
bar and the reasoning of Judge Brown in that decision 
is unimpeachable. 
In addition to the General Insurance Company 
vs. Western Fire & Casualty Company (supra) case, 
there are a number of cases holding that the state of 
title is immaterial and. does not increase the risk 
insured against. See Mid-States Ins. Co. vs. Brandon, 
340 Ill. App. 470, 92 NE 2d 540; Commonw£!alth 
Casualty Company vs. Arrigo, 160 Md. 595, 154 A 
136, 77 ALR 1250; Pauli vs. St. Paul Mercury Indem-
nity Company, 167 Misc. 417, 4 NY Sup. 2d 41, 
affirmed 255 App. Div. 935, 8 NY Sup. 2d 691, App. 
Den 280 NY 853, 19 NE 2d 685; Kuntz vs. Spence, 
Tex Civ. App. 1931, 48 S.W. 2d 413. 
Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile La.w and 
Practice, Perm. Ed. Part I, #3873 Page 537, states as 
follows: 
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"The rule requiring possession by the insured of 
an insurable interest in the property forming the sub-
ject matter of the insurance, which prevails generally 
in casualty insurance, is not applicable to liability 
indemnity policies." 
"The character of the insurance is quite different 
from insurance, against injury or loss, of the property 
insured by fire, theft, collision, or the like, where the 
insured is required to have some real interest in the 
property insured; in the case of liability insurance 
the risk and hazard insured against is not the injury 
or loss of the property named in the policy, but 
against loss and injury caused by the use of the 
property therein named, for which the insured might 
be liable, and the right of the insured to recover does 
not depend upon his being the holder, in fact of either 
a legal or equitable title or interest in the property, 
but whether he is primarily charged at law or in 
equity with an obligation for which he is liable." 
Raymond, a member of Loyd's household, was 
covered by the insurance policy while driving any 
vehicle. He likewise would be covered while driving 
the vehicle described regardless of who held title, and 
no additional risk would be created when he drove 




THE POLICY WHEN CONSTRUED IN ALL ITS 
TERMS PROVIDES COVERAGE FOR RAY-
MOND. 
The policy must be interpreted favorably to the 
insured being insured where there is a dispute as to 
its meaning. See Appleman, Vol. 13, Page 36, #7386. 
Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile L<iw and Prac-
tice, Perm. Ed., Part I, Vol. 6, #3521, Page 138. 
In addition to the general coverage provided for 
Raymond as a member of Loyd's family and house-
hold, the coverage on the automobile described is 
clear. A newly acquired automobile is covered if 
notice is given to the insurer. Where an accident 
occurs before notice, the cases without exception hold 
that coverage is available. 
General Insurance Company vs. Western Fire &: 
Casualty Company, 241 F 2d 289 (5 CCA), Gert. 
Denied 77 S. Ct. 1294, 354 U.S. 909, No. 941, June 
10, 1957. 
Western Casualty & Surety Company vs. Lund, 
132 F Supp. 867, Aff. 234 F 2d 916, 10 CCA, (Bratton 
Judge). (Two successive replacements of automobiles 
in 30 day period, both held covered for 30 days re-
gardless of notice to insurer.) 
Civil Service Employees Insurance ComfXJnY vs. 
Wilson, 35 Cal Rep 304, 222 Cal. App. 2d 519. 
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(Several auto covered intepret newly acquired clause 
' also clause on all autos insured with insurer pro-
vision). 
7 Appleman, Chapter 183 P. 84, states the rule 
applicable as follows: 
"The purpose of automatic insurance is to give 
coverage to persons who are already insured with the 
company in question upon acquiring a new vehicle. 
The coverage extends to the new acquisition when it 
replaces the sole automobile owned by the insured 
when the insured owns a number of vehicles and 
all of them are insured with the company, or 
when several of the vehicles owned by the insured 
are covered by the policy and the new acquisition 
replaces one already covered. It does not apply to 
new vehicles which are in addition to those insured by 
the former coverages and which are not used as 
replacements, unless all vehicles of that insured are 
covered, in which event it is contemplated that a 
premium readjustment will be made." 
California jurisdiction has solved the problem 
created here in a little different manner than the 
Federal Court in the Fifth Circuit. In Votaw vs. 
Farmers Auto Inter-Ins. Exchange, 15 Cal 2d 24, 97 P 
2d 958 126 A.LR 538, the court held that an auto-' . . 
mobile which had been sold but title not yet trans-
fered while being driven by the buyer, was a person 
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driving with the owner's permission and the public 
liability insurance coverage was provided. See also 
Clow vs. National Indemnity Company, 54 Was 2d 
198, 339 P 2d 82, where a new automobile was pur-
chased and while it was being readied for delivery, 
the insured continued to drive his old car. 
Raymond is a person included in the unqualified 
word "insured." He was a resident of the household 
of Loyd and a person who actually is designated as 
the principal driver of the vehicle insured originally. 
Automobiles acquired to replace the Ford or newly 
acquired, for 30 days would likewise be covered with-
out imposing a new or different risk on the insurer. 
If Raymond drove any kind of a motor vehicle, 
it is respectfully submitted he had public liability 
insurance for the 30 day period. No hole in his 
insurance was intended to exist. If non-owned vehicle, 
coverage is provided, if the described vehicle, coverage 
is provided, if a replacement vehicle for described 
vehicle, coverage is provided, if a newly acquired 
vehicle, coverage is provided for 30 days, the crucial 
period. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is respectfully submitted that a fair interpreta-
tion of the policy would provide coverage for Ray-
15 
mond. Judgment of the Trial Court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DWIGHT L. KING 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Hi 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
